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PROTECTING TAXPAYERS AND CRIME VICTIMS: 
THE CASE FOR RESTRICTING UTAH’S PRELIMINARY HEARINGS 
TO FELONY OFFENSES 
 
Paul G. Cassell* & Thomas E. Goodwin** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When prosecutors file serious criminal charges in Utah, the defendant is 
entitled to a preliminary hearing.1 At this hearing, witnesses will testify and be 
cross-examined to determine if the defendant should be bound over to face trial. 
For many decades, however, Utah has held such hearings only for felony offenses, 
not misdemeanors.2 In this respect, Utah practice tracked that of the vast majority 
of other states, which limit the use of preliminary hearings to more serious felony 
crimes. 
The reasons for limiting preliminary hearings to more serious felony cases are 
easy to understand. Preliminary hearings are costly and time consuming. They can 
also burden victims of crime with the need to testify and be cross-examined about 
the details of crimes committed against them. These clear costs are not outweighed 
by the very limited value that preliminary hearings provide, namely allowing 
judicial review of a prosecutor’s evidence. For misdemeanor prosecutions, a judge 
can easily decide the question of probable cause based on the information 
recounted in the charging document without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
Recently Utah suddenly became the only state in the nation to interpret its 
constitution to require preliminary hearings for certain classes of misdemeanors. In 
State v. Hernandez,3 the Utah Supreme Court held that for “Class A” 
misdemeanors (misdemeanors punishable by up to a year in jail), article I, section 
13 of the Utah Constitution required preliminary hearings.4 Article I, section 13 
provides for preliminary hearings for “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment.”5 The court concluded that the phrase “offenses 
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” referred not only to felony 
                                           
* © 2011 Paul G. Cassell. Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law at 
the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. I thank the Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office and Rick Schwermer of the Administrative Office of the Courts for 
helpful information.  
** © 2011 Thomas E. Goodwin. Class of 2012, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. 
1 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(h)(1)–(2). 
2 See Melinda Rogers, Court: Some Misdemeanors Deserve Preliminary Hearings, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2011), www.http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=14302714 
&itype=storyID&keyword=&qtype=. 
3 State v. Hernandez, No. 20090080, 2011 WL 5343347 (Utah Nov. 8, 2011). 
4 Id. at *9. 
5 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13. 
2 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
offenses but under Utah’s modern classification of offenses, to Class A 
misdemeanors as well.6 
The court’s analytical approach was quite properly historical. The court noted 
that the decisive question when interpreting the state constitution is “to ascertain 
the drafters’ intent.”7 Yet strong arguments suggest that the drafters did not truly 
intend to require preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors.8 Section 13 
appears to refer to federal law that “heretofore” controlled the Territory of Utah.9 
At the time the Utah Constitution was drafted, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution directed that capital and infamous crimes—felonies—be screened 
through the requirement of a grand jury indictment.10 The framers of the Utah 
Constitution, it can be argued, simply continued this approach and then authorized 
a new alternative method for screening such felony prosecutions—a preliminary 
hearing instead of a grand jury. This was the argument the state advanced in 
Hernandez, although the court ultimately found it unpersuasive.11 
This Article does not debate the historical accuracy of the court’s decision. 
Rather, it asks whether the decision is sound public policy. This Article concludes 
that requiring preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors is undesirable for 
two simple reasons. First, the court’s decision will result in hundreds of additional 
preliminary hearings a year, thus imposing substantial costs on taxpayers and 
burdens on an already overwhelmed criminal justice system. Second, the decision 
will create substantial hardships for crime victims, who will now be twice 
subjected to cross-examination by defense attorneys—once at the preliminary 
hearing and again later at trial. And these costs will generate no significant benefit 
in return. 
As there is no federal constitutional right at stake, the Hernandez decision 
rests solely on an interpretation of the Utah Constitution.12 The Utah Constitution 
can, of course, be amended. Because preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases 
impose significant costs without compensating benefits, the Utah legislature 
should send a constitutional amendment to voters to reinstate the modern practice 
of providing preliminary hearings only for felonies—a practice that served Utah 
well for over thirty years without significant complaint. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of preliminary 
hearings and compares Utah’s procedure to other states. Part III reviews the Utah 
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hernandez. Part IV discusses the decision’s 
consequences for taxpayers, the criminal justice system, and crime victims. 
Finally, Part V advocates a state constitutional amendment to override the 
                                           
6 Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *3. 
7 Id. at *2. 
8 See generally Brief of Appellee at 14–15, Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347 (No. 
20090080-SC). 
9 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11 Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *2–3. 
12 See, e.g., Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause does not require an examination by a magistrate prior to prosecution). 
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Hernandez decision and restore Utah’s preliminary hearing practice to its historical 
form. 
 
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY HEARINGS 
 
A.  Screening Charges in the Criminal Justice Process 
 
When a prosecutor alleges that a defendant should be tried for a crime, an 
issue arises as to what sort of screening mechanism (if any) should be in place to 
evaluate the prosecutor’s allegation before the trial. In the federal system, this 
screening function is performed by grand juries.13 Under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, an indictment is a sufficient basis for binding a defendant 
over to face trial.14 Accordingly, federal prosecutors proceed by way of an 
indictment.15 A federal grand jury is comprised of sixteen to twenty-three jurors16 
selected in much the same way a federal trial jury is selected.17 To indict, the 
federal system requires twelve affirmative votes. The grand jury, and the grand 
jury alone, decides whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a defendant with 
a crime.18 
The indictment process implicates the Fifth Amendment, which provides that 
“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”19 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has interpreted “infamous crime” under the Fifth Amendment to require indictment 
only for crimes punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary.20 As a result, 
because only those persons sentenced to imprisonment for more than one year—
that is, only felons—can serve time in a penitentiary, the Fifth Amendment does 
not require indictment for federal misdemeanors.21 In sum, while federal 
constitutional law requires a grand jury indictment for felony cases, it does not 
require such grand jury screening for misdemeanors. 
                                           
13 United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (noting the grand 
jury’s purpose is to “ferret out crimes deserving of prosecution, or to screen out charges not 
warranting prosecution”). 
14 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2).  
15 In rare situations, a grand jury cannot meet within fourteen days to review charges 
against a defendant who has been arrested and is held in custody. In that situation, a federal 
prosecutor is required to go through a preliminary hearing to continue to hold the 
defendant. See id. at 5.1(c). 
16 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2(g) (3d ed. 2007). 
17 Id. § 15.2(a). 
18 See id. § 15.1(d). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
20 Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886). 
21 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (2006) (“A sentence for an offense punishable by imprisonment 
for one year or less shall not be served in a penitentiary without the consent of the 
defendant.”). 
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The practice for screening charges is varied among the states. While the Fifth 
Amendment requires grand jury screening of federal felony offenses, the Supreme 
Court has not incorporated the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment 
as a fundamental right made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.22 Therefore, states (including Utah) are not obligated as a matter of 
federal constitutional law to proceed by indictment. Furthermore, because the U.S. 
Supreme Court has also held that due process does not require even a neutral 
review of the decision to prosecute,23 states are free to craft their own approaches 
to reviewing a prosecutor’s decision to file charges. 
In crafting their own approaches, eighteen states have chosen to follow the 
federal practice and to require a grand jury indictment for felonies (“indictment 
states”).24 Four states require indictment for only the most serious crimes, such as 
capital offenses or crimes punishable by life imprisonment.25 Twenty-eight states 
provide for prosecution by indictment or information26 (“information states”).27 
Most information and indictment states have chosen to review a prosecutor’s 
decision to file charges by holding a preliminary hearing.28 As the name suggests, 
a “preliminary” hearing is a hearing held early in the criminal justice process to 
make sure that the prosecution possesses sufficient evidence to warrant binding 
over a defendant to face trial.29 Consistent with this screening function, the burden 
of proof at a preliminary hearing is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as would 
occur at trial, but rather mere probable cause that the suspect has committed the 
crime charged.30 
 
                                           
22 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). 
23 See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (stating that because the due 
process clause “does not require the State to adopt the institution and procedure of a grand 
jury, we are unable to see upon what theory it can be held that an examination, or the 
opportunity for one, prior to the formal accusation by the district attorney, is obligatory 
upon the states”). 
24 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 15.1(d) (Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West 
Virginia). 
25 Id. § 15.1(e), at 431–32 (Florida, Minnesota, Louisiana, and Rhode Island). 
26 An “information” is simply a charging document prepared by a prosecutor. 
27 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 15.1(g) n.344 (Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming).  
28 See generally infra Part VI. The “common pattern” in indictment states that provide 
for preliminary hearings “is to allow bypassing without restriction, as in the Federal 
system.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 14.2(c). 
29 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 16, § 14.1(a). 
30 Id. 
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B.  Utah Preliminary Hearings before Hernandez 
 
Utah is an “information state”—that is, it follows the majority of states and 
allows the prosecution to proceed to trial not only by way of a grand jury 
indictment but also through an information. In some cases, however, Utah requires 
that the information itself be further reviewed to determine whether sufficient 
evidence underlies it. Indeed, article I, section 13 of Utah’s constitution provides: 
“Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted 
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.”31 The reference 
to cases being prosecuted after “examination and commitment by a magistrate” 
establishes the requirement of a preliminary hearing for certain offenses.32 The 
offenses for which preliminary hearings are required are those offenses “heretofore 
required to be prosecuted by indictment.”33 
Before the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hernandez, article I, 
section 13 was generally understood to require preliminary hearings only for 
felony offenses.34 This understanding was consistent with the federal approach, 
which also required grand jury indictment only for felony offenses.35 For example, 
in 1978, the Utah legislature created a new division of responsibility between 
circuit courts and district courts.36 The legislature specifically provided that it was 
conferring jurisdiction over Class A misdemeanors to circuit courts, making clear 
that this did not carry with it any right to a preliminary hearing in the circuit courts: 
 
All public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed 
from justices’ and circuit courts, as well as class A misdemeanors triable 
in circuit courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment[;] . . . 
but preliminary hearings shall not be required for class A misdemeanors 
triable in circuit courts.37 
                                           
31 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 13. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Utah practice has also apparently been to hold a preliminary hearing on 
misdemeanors that are charged in the same information as a felony. For example, if a 
defendant is charged with aggravated assault against his girlfriend (a felony) and violation 
of a protective order (a misdemeanor), the preliminary hearing will usually address both 
charges. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 175 P.3d 1029, 1030 (Utah 2007); State v. Harter, 155 
P.3d 116, 119 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). This Article sets such “mixed” cases aside, and 
focuses on whether there should be a stand-alone right to preliminary hearing when the 
information charges only a misdemeanor offense. 
35 Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1) (stating that felonies must be prosecuted by 
indictment) with id. at 58(b)(1) (providing that misdemeanors may be charged with an 
information). 
36 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1 (West 1978). 
37 Id. 
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The understanding that preliminary hearings would not be held for 
misdemeanor offenses has also long been reflected in the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which require that “all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, 
misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information . . . 
before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged.”38 Utah law defines 
an information as “an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a public 
offense.”39 The information must be “sworn to by a person having reason to 
believe the offense has been committed.”40 Furthermore, in the case of a felony or 
Class A misdemeanor, the prosecuting attorney must “first authorize the filing of 
[the] information.”41 
Even though Utah had not historically held a preliminary hearing for 
misdemeanor charges, it still had a mechanism for reviewing prosecutors’ charging 
decisions in such cases. Under the Utah rules, a magistrate reviewed filed 
information to determine whether “there [was] probable cause to believe that an 
offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it.”42 If probable 
cause existed, then the magistrate issued an arrest warrant or summons for the 
accused to appear.43 Then, in the case of a misdemeanor charge, the magistrate 
would “call upon the defendant to enter a plea.”44 
In contrast, in the case of a felony charge, the magistrate would continue and 
inform the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing.45 The defendant could 
then choose to either waive the preliminary hearing (with the consent of the 
prosecutor46) or set such a hearing. If the defendant requested a preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate would schedule the hearing “within a reasonable time, but 
not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than thirty days if the defendant is not in custody.”47 
Under the Utah rules, the preliminary hearing in felony cases is an adversarial 
proceeding. Generally, the hearing parallels a trial: the state must satisfy its burden 
to prove the elements of the crime charged and can do so by presenting evidence 
and calling witnesses.48 The defendant can cross-examine the state’s witnesses, 
and then present his or her own case by testifying, offering evidence, and calling 
defense witnesses.49 However, the preliminary hearing does not reach the ultimate 
question of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, consistent with its function as 
                                           
38 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
39 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(3) (West 2011). 
40 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 4(a). 
41 Id. at 5(b). 
42 Id. at 6(a). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 7(g). 
45 Id. at 7(h)(1).  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 7(h)(2). 
48 See id. at 7(i)(1). 
49 Id. 
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a screening mechanism, the standard of proof at the hearing is only probable 
cause—“a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it.”50 Also, the magistrate’s finding of probable cause “may 
be based on hearsay in whole or in part,” and the defendant does not have the 
opportunity to object to unlawfully obtained evidence.51 If there is a finding of 
probable cause, the magistrate will bind the defendant over for trial; otherwise, the 
magistrate must dismiss the charges without prejudice.52 
To summarize, before Hernandez, Utah law guaranteed every person accused 
of a crime an initial examination of the prosecutor’s evidence by an impartial 
judge. However, Utah law extended this additional right for a preliminary hearing 
only to those charged with felony offense. 
 
C.  Preliminary Hearings in Other States 
 
The Appendix in Part VI of this Article surveys the provisions dealing with 
preliminary hearings in the other forty-nine states. From these provisions, it is clear 
that a majority of states restrict preliminary hearings to felony charges, just as Utah 
did before Hernandez.53 Some states provide a conditional right to a preliminary 
hearing if an indictment or information has not been filed, thus allowing 
prosecutors to bypass the preliminary hearing altogether by filing one of these 
charging documents.54 Still other states allow magistrates to make the probable 
cause determination without an adversary preliminary hearing by looking at the 
evidence in the charging documents and supporting affidavits.55 
Before Hernandez, not one state interpreted its constitution to require 
preliminary hearings for misdemeanors. In fact, it appears that only four states—
Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Tennessee—offered a statutory right to 
a preliminary hearing for some classifications of misdemeanors.56 
 
                                           
50 State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 304 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). 
51 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(i)(2). For discussion of the reasons underlying this language, 
see Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s 
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1423–56 (explaining that hearsay 
evidence is commonly used in preliminary hearings around the country). 
52 UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(i)(3). 
53 See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Hawai’i, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
54 See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina). 
55 See, e.g., infra Part VI.A (Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, 
Vermont, and Washington). 
56 See infra Part VI.B. 
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III.  STATE V. HERNANDEZ 
 
In State v. Hernandez, the defendant asked the Utah Supreme Court to reverse 
the long-settled practice in Utah of providing preliminary hearings only for felony 
offenses.57 The case arose from the following facts, recounted in the prosecution’s 
criminal information: 
 
On November 24, 2007, Hernandez provided Dillon Whitney, a 
minor, and two of Whitney’s friends with alcohol at Hernandez’s 
apartment. Whitney drank a large amount of vodka, and became drunk 
and “out of it.” The two friends left the apartment for a short time. When 
they returned, they found Whitney lying unconscious at the bottom of a 
flight of stairs outside the apartment. With Hernandez’s help, the two 
friends carried Whitney back into Hernandez’s apartment. Hernandez 
then told the friends that they could leave and that he would take care of 
Whitney. Whitney was alive at this time. 
The next day, Hernandez called the police and reported a man was 
“down” outside his apartment. The police responded and found Whitney 
unconscious, lying near the top of the stairs in front of Hernandez’s 
apartment. Hernandez denied knowing Whitney and lied about whether 
Whitney had been inside his (Hernandez’s) apartment. Hernandez 
claimed that he found Whitney outside his apartment that morning, 
unresponsive and with a bump on his head. Whitney was transported to a 
hospital, where he died. The cause of death was blunt force trauma to the 
head. The police later found an illegal drug pipe inside Hernandez’s 
apartment, which is located within 1000 feet of a school.58 
 
Prosecutors charged Hernandez in a criminal information with four Class A 
misdemeanors: negligent homicide, obstruction of justice, unlawful sale of or 
furnishing of alcohol to minors, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free 
zone.59 Hernandez moved for a preliminary hearing. He conceded that the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized preliminary hearings only for felony 
offenses.60 He argued, however, that article I, section 13 of the state constitution 
mandated preliminary hearings not only for felonies but also for Class A 
misdemeanors.61 After the district court denied the motion, Hernandez was 
allowed to take an interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.62 
At the supreme court, the dispute centered on the historical meaning of the 
phrase “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” in article I, 
                                           
57 State v. Hernandez, No. 20090080, 2011 WL 5343347, at *1 (Utah Nov. 8, 2011). 
58 Information, State v. Hernandez, No. 071908841 (3d Dist. Ct. Nov. 30, 2007). 
59 Id. 
60 Brief of Appellee at 3, Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347 (No. 20090080-SC).  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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section 13—in other words, “which crimes were required to be prosecuted by 
indictment up to the adoption of the Utah Constitution”?63 The supreme court 
considered three possible interpretations. First, the district court read the phrase as 
referring to specific crimes that were indictable offenses under territorial law.64 
However, because Hernandez’s alleged crimes did not exist under territorial law, 
his crimes could not have been “indictable offenses” and thus could not now 
require a preliminary hearing under article I, section 13.65 The supreme court 
rejected this approach mainly because, under both Utah territorial law and the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “the question of which offenses were 
indictable . . . was not determined by looking to a list of specific offenses.”66 
Rather, under both schemes, “the applicability of the indictment requirement [was] 
based on the severity of the punishment rather than on the elements of any 
particular offense.”67 
The state offered a second interpretation. Instead of referring to specific 
crimes, as the district court found, the state argued that article I, section 13 referred 
“only to felony offenses because only felony offenses were required to be 
prosecuted by indictment under the federal constitution,” which was binding on the 
Utah Territory before statehood.68 According to this interpretation, article I, section 
13 simply “reflects the framers’ intent that felony offenses could [now] be 
prosecuted either by way of information or indictment.”69 In rejecting this 
approach, the supreme court recognized that although the federal constitution was 
indeed binding on the Utah Territory, the territory was free to provide greater 
protection, which it did by extending the right to prosecution by indictment “to 
misdemeanors punishable by more than six months in the city or county jail.”70 
In the end, the defense provided the winning interpretation. Hernandez’s 
defense attorneys agreed with the state that article I, section 13 did not refer to 
specific territorial crimes, as the district court had found.71 But they argued that the 
provision applied to more than just felonies: it applied to that “class of offenses 
over which district courts had original jurisdiction under Utah territorial law.”72 
Under territorial law, district courts had jurisdiction over “indictable offenses”—
specifically, “crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than six months.”73 
Accordingly, Hernandez argued that, because the Class A misdemeanors he 
allegedly committed carried a possible penalty of more than six months in jail, the 
                                           
63 Hernandez, 2011 WL 5343347, at *2. 
64 Id. at *1. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at *6. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *3. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. at *1. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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Utah Constitution requires prosecution by information and the right to a 
preliminary hearing.74 The supreme court agreed.75 
The state presented an alternative argument to avoid having to provide full-
blown preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors. It argued that even if 
article I, section 13 applies to Class A misdemeanors, the “examination and 
commitment by a magistrate” requirement could be satisfied by something less 
than the modern preliminary hearing.76 According to the state, the magistrate’s 
review of the information, already mandated by Utah criminal procedure, satisfied 
the constitutional requirement.77 The Court again rejected the state’s argument, 
concluding that the language of article I, section 13 contemplates a more searching 
evidentiary hearing,78 and, historically, the procedure for prosecuting indictable 
offenses in Utah approximates the modern procedure for prosecuting felonies.79 
Thus, the Court held that article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
the right to a modern preliminary hearing for Class A misdemeanors.80 
 
IV.  THE UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES OF HERNANDEZ 
 
As mentioned at the outset, the purpose of this Article is not to contest the 
merits of the Utah Supreme Court’s historical analysis.81 Instead, this Article 
considers the public policy implications of the court’s holding requiring 
preliminary hearings not only for felony cases but also for Class A misdemeanors. 
From a cost-benefit perspective, Hernandez imposes significant costs on Utah’s 
criminal justice system. The costs fall into two areas: first, burdens on the criminal 
justice system in terms of additional expense from holding such hearings; and, 
second, burdens on crime victims from having to testify at such hearings. Each of 
these costs is discussed in turn below. Of course, it is possible that Hernandez has 
compensating benefits that outweighs these costs. The concluding section 
considers—and rejects—this possibility. 
 
A.  The Fiscal Cost to the System and Taxpayers 
 
The most obvious cost of the Hernandez decision is that it will result in a 
substantial number of additional preliminary hearings each year, costing the Utah 
criminal justice system and taxpayers alike. While it is too early to give precise 
numbers on how Hernandez has played out in the state’s courtrooms, it is possible 
to derive a reasonable estimate. As of October 13, 2011, Utah trial courts had 
                                           
74 Id. 
75 Id. at *7. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at *7–8. 
80 Id. at *9. 
81 See supra notes 63–80 and accompanying text. 
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handled 5,410 Class A misdemeanors during the year.82 Since Hernandez was 
decided some six-and-a-half months earlier (covering about 70 percent of the days 
in the year), it seems fair to assume that, with a steady calendar, about 70 percent 
of these cases were decided after Hernandez. This means that a total of 3,787 Class 
A misdemeanors have been processed by Utah’s courts after Hernandez. Of these 
cases, 982 were “calendared” for a preliminary hearing—that is, judges reserved 
room on their calendars for preliminary hearings.83 Not every calendared 
preliminary hearing is actually held. In many cases, the parties reach some kind of 
agreement that eliminates the need for such a hearing. A conservative estimate is 
that 30 percent of calendared preliminary hearings are actually held.84 Proceeding 
on that basis, so far this year since Hernandez, Utah judges have held 295 
preliminary hearings. Because those hearings cover only part of year (the six-and-
a-half months since Hernandez), an annual figure estimate can be derived by 
calculating the number that would be held in a full twelve months—approximately 
545 preliminary hearings. 
As a cross-check on these numbers, a different calculation method reaches 
roughly the same conclusion. The Administrative Office of the Court reports that 
prosecutors file about 8,000 Class A misdemeanors in Utah each year.85 Of course, 
not every filed misdemeanor charge ultimately leads to a preliminary hearing. In 
some cases, a defendant pleads guilty before a preliminary hearing is ever set. In 
other cases, the hearing may be set but then waived as part of a plea bargain or 
other negotiated process. An estimate of the number of hearings held can be 
derived by assuming that the same percentage of misdemeanor cases will go to 
preliminary hearing as do felony cases. About 7 to 8 percent of felony cases go to a 
preliminary hearing, so, assuming misdemeanors will track felonies, the 
expectation is that approximately 7 to 8 percent of the 8,000 Class A 
misdemeanors will reach a full preliminary hearing.86 On this calculation method, 
Utah courts should expect to see an additional 560 to 640 preliminary hearings a 
year as a result of Hernandez.87 In summary, both calculation methods produce 
roughly the same estimated annual number of additional preliminary hearings of 
around 540 to 640. 
How much will these additional preliminary hearings cost the courts? The 
administrative office estimates that Utah courts currently spend 1,450 hours (or 
87,000 minutes) a year holding preliminary hearings.88 This time costs the courts 
                                           
82 Telephone Interview with Rick Schwermer, Assistant State Court Adm’r, Utah 
Admin. Office of the Courts (Oct. 13, 2011). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Telephone Interview with Rick Schwermer, Assistant State Court Adm’r, Utah 
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approximately $300,000 for judges and support staff.89 Thus, based on these 
figures, one minute of preliminary hearing time costs the state roughly $3.40. 
Assuming that, on average, a full preliminary hearing requires 90 minutes of 
court time, the 545 to 640 additional preliminary hearings required by Hernandez 
will cost the courts in the neighborhood of $200,000 per year—$166,700 on the 
low end and approximately $217,600 on the high end. 
Of course, the financial costs associated with preliminary hearings are not 
limited to simply courts (judges and their staffs). Prosecutors must prepare for and 
attend preliminary hearings. Unlike a judge who can simply evaluate arguments 
presented during the hearing, the prosecutor must prepare to present the case. This 
involves subpoenaing witnesses (who must be paid witness fees), meeting with 
witnesses to review their testimony, and (of course) presenting the testimony at the 
preliminary hearing. Frequently, the prosecutor at a preliminary hearing is assisted 
by a “case agent”—that is, by the police officer who has investigated the case. All 
of this costs the taxpayers money in some form. 
On the defense side of the equation, the defendant is often indigent and 
receives court-appointed counsel at state expense.90 The defense attorney must also 
prepare for the preliminary hearing, although this may often involve less work than 
the prosecutor’s preparation, as defense attorneys need not build an affirmative 
case at the preliminary hearing stage. Even so, there are reasons to believe this cost 
to defense counsel is significant. Since defense attorney time is a limited resource, 
the time defense attorneys spend at preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases is 
necessarily subtracted from other (perhaps more important) work that they might 
perform. 
While it would be difficult to calculate with precision an exact dollar cost for 
all these expenses, it seems reasonable to estimate that these nonjudicial costs for 
preliminary hearings would (at least) match the costs to the judiciary. If so, the 
total direct financial cost to the state annually from Hernandez is around $400,000. 
It is important to understand what this figure means. The $400,000 is simply a 
(conservative) estimate of the annual cost to the taxpayers of holding preliminary 
hearings for Class A misdemeanors around the state. But the taxpayers did not 
suddenly appropriate such a sum the day after the supreme court decided 
Hernandez. Instead, judges, prosecutors, and court-appointed defense counsel all 
had to divert their time and attention (and judicial funds) away from other matters 
to conduct the preliminary hearings mandated by Hernandez. For judges, this has 
probably meant delay in resolving other cases. For prosecutors, this has probably 
meant fewer cases being prosecuted. And for defense attorneys, this has probably 
meant more attention to misdemeanor preliminary hearings and less attention to 
                                           
89 Id. 
90 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER 
WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 2 (2001) (stating that “in some jurisdictions, public defender 
offices are appointed [in] as many as 80 percent of all criminal cases”); see also UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-32-302 (West 2011) (providing counsel for indigent defendants). 
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other matters. The cost figure derived above is simply a rough, monetized estimate 
of how much this diverted time is worth. 
 
B.  The Cost to Crime Victims 
 
The “cost” figure from the previous section is simply a rough estimate of the 
direct financial costs to the state from the court decision, to say nothing of indirect 
costs in time and reprioritization of judicial resources. But other costs need to be 
considered in evaluating the wisdom of Hernandez. Perhaps the most significant of 
these is the burden to crime victims, who are forced to testify at preliminary 
hearings. To be sure, a defendant has a constitutional right to confront witnesses 
against him,91 and crime victims may have to testify at a defendant’s trial. But the 
vast majority of criminal cases in Utah (as elsewhere) are resolved by prior 
negotiations before trial.92 Accordingly, the vast majority of crime victims will 
only have to testify if a preliminary hearing is held in their case. 
Testifying at preliminary hearings is often a traumatizing experience for crime 
victims, particularly since preliminary hearings are generally held shortly after the 
crime was committed when the pain of the experience is still fresh in the victim’s 
mind.93 Indeed, in 1994, Utah voters approved a constitutional amendment 
designed to greatly reduce the situations in which crime victims must testify at 
preliminary hearings in felony cases.94 Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment 
established a series of rights for crime victims in Utah’s criminal justice process, 
including the right to be notified of court hearings, to attend those hearings, and to 
speak at appropriate points in the process (including hearings involving bail, plea 
bargains, and sentencing).95 One sometimes-overlooked part of the victims’ rights 
protections was a provision to allow the use of “reliable hearsay” to establish the 
basis for binding over a defendant at the preliminary hearing.96 The intent of the 
drafters of this provision was to reduce the trauma that victims suffer by obviating 
the need for them to testify at preliminary hearings.97 
The legislative history supporting the provision98 established that testifying at 
preliminary hearings can often be traumatic for crime victims in Utah.99 Trauma 
                                           
91 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
92 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 912 (1996) 
(reporting that 97% of felony cases sampled in Salt Lake County were resolved before 
trial). 
93 Cassell, supra note 51, at 1434–36. 
94 Id. at 1458–60. As initially drafted, the amendment focused on felony offenses. See 
id. at 1421–22. Moreover, at the time the amendment was drafted, preliminary hearings 
were not held in misdemeanor cases. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
95 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28. 
96 Id. § 12. 
97 See Cassell, supra note 51, at 1440–49. 
98 The information that follows is drawn from id. at 1434–37, which is endorsed as “a 
statement of the drafters’ intentions” for Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment. See id. at 
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was especially severe for victims of rape and for children who have been sexually 
abused.100 These victims are forced to recount the details of horrible crimes against 
them and must endure cross-examination, while the defendant sits nearby as a 
threatening presence.101 For example, a young female victim of sexual assault was 
so worried about her testimony at a preliminary hearing that she vomited six times 
the night before and then again in the prosecutor’s office.102 She testified and was 
cross-examined for two-and-a-half hours, and was extremely upset throughout.103 
Compounding these problems is fact that there is no jury present at preliminary 
hearings. Without a fear of alienating a jury, defense attorneys can conduct 
aggressive cross-examination designed to traumatize victims and thus discourage 
them from appearing at trial or encourage them to pressure prosecutors to extend a 
generous plea offer.104 
While the legislative history from the Victims’ Rights Amendment revolved 
around felony cases, the same sorts of harms to victims can be expected to follow 
from preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases. Many significant sex offenses 
are Class A misdemeanor offenses.105 The most serious domestic violence offenses 
are also Class A misdemeanors.106 Prosecutors for these types of cases now face a 
serious question: Do they force a victim to undergo the trauma of testifying at a 
preliminary hearing or, instead, do they offer a generous plea bargain to a 
defendant? Hernandez’s creation of additional preliminary hearings that may 
subject victims to increased judicial procedures and more frequent testimony 
creates a bargaining chip for defendants that presumably will lead to more 
favorable dispositions for defendants than they would otherwise receive. 
In addition to the trauma of testifying, there is the general uncertainty 
associated with yet another hearing in the process. A concrete illustration of this 
concern comes from the impact of Hernandez on a recent case in Salt Lake 
                                           
1373 n.*. The constitutional amendment was approved by the legislature and then sent to 
the voters for their approval. 
99 See id. at 1434–35 & n.316 (collecting examples). 
100 See id. at 1434–35 & n.319 (collecting examples); see also State v. Kallin, 877 
P.2d 138, 144 (Utah 1994) (noting eleven-year-old sexual assault victim in tears for most 
of direct and cross-examination at trial). 
101 See Cassell, supra note 51, at 1435–36 n.320.  
102 Id. at 1435–36. 
103 Id. at 1436. 
104 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, FOUR YEARS LATER: A 
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 14 (1986), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/102834.pdf (noting at a preliminary hearing “the 
defense’s questioning is not restrained by a desire not to alienate the jury, and it is often the 
most grueling interrogation of the victim, especially the child victim”). 
105 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (West 2011) (sexual abuse of minor); id. § 76-
5-401.2 (unlawful sexual contact with persons sixteen or seventeen years old); id. § 76-9-
702.5 (lewdness involving a child); id. § 76-9-702 (sexual battery). 
106 Id. § 76-5-102 (assault); id. § 77-36-2.4 (violation of protective order); id. §76-5-
106.5 (stalking). 
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County. In State v. Druce,107 the defendant was charged with sexual battery and 
assault—both Class A misdemeanors under Utah law—and commission of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child.108 After the supreme court handed 
down Hernandez, the defendant requested a preliminary hearing.109 The court 
ordered a preliminary hearing. The state moved to dismiss because its witnesses 
were unavailable, and the court granted the motion.110 When the state refiled the 
charges, there was some internal miscommunication with the misdemeanor 
division of the District Attorney’s office, and the prosecutor was late in contacting 
the victims.111 The adult and child victim, it turned out, had moved to South 
Dakota.112 At this same time, the prosecutor received a request from defense 
counsel to stipulate to a continuation of the hearing.113 Given the inability to 
subpoena witnesses, the prosecutor left a message agreeing to stipulate but never 
heard back.114 At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel did not request a 
continuance after all, and this time the court dismissed the case with prejudice 
because the victim did not appear at the hearing.115 
That afternoon, the prosecutor “received a frantic phone call from the victim” 
who “had been calling the District Attorney’s office main telephone number but 
indicated that she was never transferred . . . to discuss her case.”116 Ultimately, to 
assert her rights, the victim found legal representation from the Utah Crime 
Victims’ Legal Clinic, which filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal with 
prejudice.117 The victim argued that her right to be treated fairly was violated by 
the dismissal.118 After a hearing, the judge agreed, granted the motion for 
reconsideration,119 and scheduled a preliminary hearing.120 
It is important to underscore that in this case there was never any real doubt 
about the sufficiency of the evidence to support a bindover of the defendant to 
stand trial.121 Thus, this unfortunate case demonstrates both the resources that the 
                                           
107 Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct. 2011). 
108 Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Order to Dismiss with Prejudice and 
Request for Hearing at 1, Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct. 2011). 
109 Id. at 2. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 3. 
112 Id. at 4. 
113 Id. at 3. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 4. 
116 Id. 
117 Memorandum in Support of State’s Motion for Reconsideration, Crime Victim’s 
Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Order at 1, State v. Druce, No. 111904859 (3d Dist. Ct. 
2011). 
118 Id. at 2. 
119 Minutes, Druce (No. 111904859). 
120 Id. 
121 See Pretrial Protective Order, Druce (No. 111904859). Indeed, following the 
preliminary hearing, the judge granted a protective order against the victim “because of the 
likelihood of repeated violence.” Id. The defendant was ultimately convicted of two of the 
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state must now expend, and the aggravation victims must endure, to bind a 
misdemeanor case over to trial. Indeed, in this case, the victims (one of whom was 
a child) had to travel to Utah from South Dakota to testify at the preliminary 
hearing in front of the very person who is charged with abusing them—and for 
what possible benefit? 
 
C.  The Lack of Compensating Benefits 
 
As the previous sections suggest, Hernandez imposes real costs on Utah’s 
criminal justice system. To complete any policy analysis, these costs must be 
assessed against any compensating benefits. But the advantages (if any) of 
requiring preliminary hearings for misdemeanor are vanishingly thin. 
Criminal defendants argue that they receive assistance from the decision, 
namely the opportunity to scrutinize charges at a preliminary hearing before they 
are forced to stand trial for Class A misdemeanors. But defendants who are 
charged with Class A misdemeanors already have review by a magistrate judge of 
prosecution’s criminal information.122 The argument that defendants are receiving 
noticeable benefits from Hernandez must accordingly rest on the claim that a 
preliminary hearing in front of a magistrate is a superior device for screening out 
meritless Class A misdemeanor charges. 
There are good reasons for doubting any such claim. For starters, Utah has 
long restricted preliminary hearings to felonies.123 It is possible to confirm that 
before Hernandez, no preliminary hearings were held for misdemeanors since at 
least 1978.124 In the more than thirty years that Utah operated under this system, 
there was no organized effort to change the system (so far as we have been able to 
determine). For example, there is no record of any proposed change to the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure or to Utah statutes to make such a change.125 If 
preliminary hearings for misdemeanors were important, one would expect to have 
seen some suggestion along these lines before the Hernandez case. To the contrary, 
thousands upon thousands of misdemeanor cases moved through the system 
without preliminary hearings, all, as the fact that the issue was not litigated in 
Utah’s appellate courts for several decades confirms, without documented 
complaint. 
The experience of other states also supports this conclusion. As noted earlier, 
not a single state, other than Utah, interprets its constitution to require preliminary 
hearings for misdemeanors.126 Indeed, only four of the other forty-nine states 
                                           
three counts against him, domestic violence assault and domestic violence in the presence 
of a child (although he was acquitted of sexual battery). 
122 See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
123 See Rogers, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 36–37; see also Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1325 (Utah 
1977) (providing example of a preliminary hearing for defendant charged with Class A 
misdemeanor). 
125 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra Part II.C. 
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provide a statutory right to preliminary hearings for some classifications of 
misdemeanor offenses.127 Further, there does not appear to be any apparent 
dissatisfaction with this approach in these other states. For example, we have been 
unable to find any law review articles or newspaper editorials advocating a change 
in the process.128 
In sum, from a public policy perspective, restricting preliminary hearings to 
felony cases would simply return the world to the way it was in Utah from (at 
least) 1978 through March 29, 2011—and the way it still is in forty-five of the 
other forty-nine states. Taxpayers would save money and crime victims would be 
spared testifying, all with no apparent harm to any other interest. The question then 
arises as to how to implement such a reform. 
 
V.  FIXING HERNANDEZ 
 
The solution to the problems created by Hernandez is to simply amend Utah’s 
constitution so that it does not require preliminary hearings in misdemeanor cases. 
Utah’s constitution provides an amendment process.129 The Utah legislature should 
send a one-word constitutional amendment to voters to reinstate the conventional 
practice of providing preliminary hearings for felonies only. Article I, section 13 of 
the Utah Constitution should be amended by changing one word as follows:  
 
OffensesFelonies heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the 
accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and 
the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
 
This amendment would limit the requirement for preliminary hearing (or 
indictment) to situations involving “felony” offenses. The change would create no 
interpretation issues, as the term “felony” is a well-defined term.130 Of course, 
even with this constitutional change, the state legislature would be free to provide 
for preliminary hearings in misdemeanors cases through separate legislation if it 
                                           
127 See supra Part II.C. 
128 But cf. John D. King, Procedural Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the 
Adjudication of Misdemeanors 3 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal. Stud. Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 2011-19, 2011), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1953880 
(exploring adjudication of misdemeanors and arguing that “the procedural safeguards and 
due process protections that accompany a criminal prosecution in theory must be applied to 
those offenses considered petty just as they are to more serious offenses”).  
129 UTAH CONST. art. XXIII.  
130 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-103 (West 2011) (defining “felony” offenses under 
the Utah Code); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (9th ed. 2009) (defining felony as “serious 
crime usu. punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death”).  
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thought that such a step was appropriate. The proposed amendment simply 
eliminates the constitutional requirement for such hearings. 
Additionally, the proposed amendment would not have any unpredictable 
consequences. To the contrary, it simply returns Utah to the practice that served 
the state well for over thirty years without an apparent problem. And as explained 
in this Article, such a change would save the state money and spare crime victims 
needless trauma. Hopefully the legislature will propose such an amendment at the 
earliest opportunity. Both taxpayers and crime victims would benefit as a result. 




The following is a comprehensive survey undertaken for this Article. It 
reveals that the vast majority of states restrict preliminary hearings to felonies.  
 




ALA. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (“A defendant charged by complaint with the 




ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(e)(2) (“A defendant is entitled to a preliminary 
examination if the defendant is charged with a felony for which the defendant has 




ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (outlining timeline for preliminary hearing “[w]hen a 




ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.3(c) (“[T]he judicial officer shall . . . determine by an 
informal, non-adversary hearing whether there is probable cause for detaining the 
arrested person pending further proceedings.” (emphasis added)); see also Barber 
v. Arkansas, 429 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding there “is no requirement that 
a preliminary hearing be afforded to a defendant prosecuted under a felony 
information” under Arkansas law); Payne v. State, 295 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ark. 
1956) (holding information need not be quashed because it was issued before a 




CAL. PENAL CODE § 738 (West 2008) (“Before an information is filed there 
must be a preliminary examination . . . .”); id. § 737 (“All felonies shall be 
prosecuted by indictment or information.”); id. § 740 (“[A]ll misdemeanors . . . 
must be prosecuted by written complaint . . . .”).  
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Colorado:  
 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-301(a)(2) (2011) (“Every person accused of a . . . 
felony by direct information or felony complaint has the right to demand and 




CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-46a(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (providing 
that no defendant “shall be put to plea or held to trial for any crime punishable by 




DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(d) (providing that a “preliminary examination 
shall not be held if the defendant is indicted or if an information against the 




FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b)(1) (providing a qualified right “to an adversary 




State v. Middlebrooks, 222 S.E.2d 343, 345–46 (Ga. 1976) (holding “that a 
preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an 





HAW. R. PEN. P. 5(c) (providing that “a defendant charged with a felony shall 





IDAHO CRIM. R. 5.1(a) (“[A] defendant, when charged in a complaint with 
any felony, is entitled to a preliminary hearing.”). 
 




725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/109-3.1(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) 
(requiring either a preliminary examination or an indictment “for the alleged 




IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-2(a) (LexisNexis 1998) (providing that “the facts 
upon which the arrest was made shall be submitted to the judicial officer, ex parte, 
in a probable cause affidavit” for the judicial officer to determine whether probable 
cause exists); see also Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Ind. 2000) 




IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.2(4)(a) (requiring a preliminary hearing “unless the 




KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2902(1) (2010) (“The state and every person charged 
with a felony shall have a right to a preliminary examination before a magistrate  




KY. R. CRIM. P. 3.07 (“A defendant who has not been indicted is entitled to a 
preliminary hearing . . . when charged with an offense requiring an indictment  




LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 291 (2003) (providing “authority to conduct 




ME. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (Class A, B, and C crimes require indictment, unless 
waived); id. at 5(a)(2) (Class D and E crimes require probable cause determination 
by court according to Rule 4A when arrest is made without warrant); id. at 4A(a) 
(requires court to determine whether probable cause exists to believe crime has 
been committed). The probable cause determination under Rule 4A does not 
appear to be an adversarial preliminary hearing, as the acceptable evidence is 
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limited to the sworn complaint, affidavits, and sworn oral statements capable of 




MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-221(a) (West 2002) (“A defendant charged 




MASS. R. CRIM. P. 3(f) (stating defendants charged “with an offense as to 
which they have the right to be proceeded against by indictment . . . have the right 





MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 766.4 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2011) (“[T]he 
magistrate before whom any person is arraigned on a charge of having committed 




MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.03(1) (requiring “a probable cause determination” for 
warrantless arrests). A signed complaint establishing the facts of the crime satisfies 
the probable cause requirement in Rule 4.03. See Id. at 4.03(3). Minnesota law also 
provides for an Omnibus Hearing for those defendants charged with a felony or 
gross misdemeanor who do not plead guilty, id. at 11, but the purpose of that 
hearing is to prepare for trial, and thus its scope is broader than the traditional 




Mayfield v. State, 612 So.2d 1120, 1129 (Miss. 1992) (holding “that once a 
defendant has been indicted by a grand jury, the right to a preliminary hearing is 




MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.250 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (preventing the filing 
of “any information charging any person or persons with any felony, until such 
person or persons shall first have been accorded the right of a preliminary 
examination”).  
 




MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-10-105(2)–(3) (2010) (requiring a preliminary 
examination unless “the district court has granted leave to file an information” or 
“an indictment has been returned”); id. § 46-11-201 (“If it appears [from affidavit] 
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the 




NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-504 (Lexis Nexis 2009) (requiring preliminary 




N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 601:1 (2007) (“No person shall be tried for any 
offense, the punishment of which may be death or imprisonment for more than one 




N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:4-3(a) (requiring probable cause hearing if an indictment 




State v. Greyeyes, 734 P.2d 789, 792 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (“An accused has 




N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.10(1) (providing that “[u]pon the defendant’s 
arraignment . . . upon a felony complaint” the court must inform the defendant of 




State v. Lester, 240 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. 1978) (holding probable cause 




N.D. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)(2) (“If the defendant is charged with a felony, the 
magistrate must inform the defendant . . . of the defendant’s right to a preliminary 
examination . . . .”). 




OHIO R. CRIM. P. 5(A)(4) (requiring judge or magistrate to inform the 




OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 258 (2003 & Supp. 2012) (“There shall be no 




OR. REV. STAT. § 135.070(2) (2011) (requiring the magistrate to inform 
defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing when the defendant is charged with 




R.I. DIST. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (requiring a preliminary hearing for defendants 
charged with felonies); see id. at 9 (no requirement for preliminary hearing for 




S.C. R. CRIM. P. 2(b) (providing that a “[preliminary] hearing shall not be held 




TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 16.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (“The 
accused in any felony case shall have the right to an examining trial before 




VT. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (requiring a probable cause determination “in the manner 




VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-183(B) (2008 & Supp. 2011) (“In felony cases, the 
accused shall not be called upon to plead, but he may cross-examine any witness[,] 
. . . introduce witnesses in his own behalf, and testify in his own behalf.”). 
 




WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 10.37.010 (West 2002) (“No pleading other than 
an indictment, information or complaint shall be required on the part of the state in 
any criminal proceedings in any court of the state, and when such pleading is in the 
manner and form as provided by law the defendant shall be required to plead 
thereto as prescribed by law without any further action or proceedings of any kind 




W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-8 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring those offenses 
presented by indictment to be preceded by preliminary examination); id. § 62-2-1 




WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.02 (West 1998) (“If the defendant is charged with a 
felony in any complaint . . . no information or indictment shall be filed until the 




WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-9-129 (2011) (“Circuit courts have original jurisdiction 
in all misdemeanor criminal cases.”); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) (“In all cases 
required to be tried in the district court, except upon indictment, the defendant 
shall be entitled to a preliminary examination . . . .”). 
 
B.  States with a Statutory Right to Preliminary Hearings  




NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.202 (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring district 
attorney to conduct “preliminary examinations where a felony or gross 




PA. R. CRIM. P. 540(E)(2) (requiring “issuing authority” to inform defendant 
“of the right to have a preliminary hearing”). While this rule does not distinguish 
between felonies and misdemeanors, a contact at the Pennsylvania Office of 
Attorney General confirmed that the rule applies to misdemeanor defendants. 
Telephone Interview with an Attorney at the Pa. Office of Attorney Gen. (Jan. 4, 
2012).  




S.D. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (“No defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing 




TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5(e)(1) (“Any defendant arrested or served with a criminal 
summons prior to indictment or presentment for a misdemeanor or felony . . . is 
entitled to a preliminary hearing.”).  
 
